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MANAGED CARE AND THE BUSINESS
OF INSURANCE: WHEN IS A
PROVIDER GROUP CONSIDERED
TO BE AT RISK?
Ericka L. Rutenberg
INTRODUCTION
In August 1995, the Health Plan Accountability Working Group
(HPAWG) of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) issued a "Suggested Bulletin Regarding Certain Types of
Compensation Reimbursement Arrangements Between Health Care
Providers and Individuals, Employers and Other Groups" (Bulletin).
HPAWG was charged with developing a single model health care
licensing act for all "health carriers." This act was referred to as CLEAR,
or the Consolidated Licensure of Entities Accepting Risk Model Act, and
was intended to cover Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), point-of-service plans, fee-
for-service plans, Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans, commercial plans and all
other entities that finance and deliver health care services on a risk-sharing
or risk assuming basis.
During a series of public hearings to better determine the types of
risk-bearing arrangements engaged in the business of insurance, the
HPAWG became aware of group health providers, such as Integrated
Provider Organizations (IPOs), Integrated Provider Associations (IPAs),
Physician Health Organizations (PHOs), and Provider Sponsored
Networks (PSNs) entering into compensation, reimbursement, and risk
sharing arrangements. It was the overwhelming opinion of members of
the HPAWG that entities that accept risk on a prepaid basis are engaged
in the business of insurance and need to be concerned about existing
*ManagingEditor, IOURNALOFHEALHCARELAW. B.S., Skidmore College, 1993; JD., DePaul
University College of Law, 1996; LL.M. (Cand.) DePaul University College of Law, 1997.
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insurance licensure laws. Entities that only accept downstremn risk from
licensed health carriers are excepted from the NAIC opinion.
This article addresses issues raised by the NAIC's bulletin and
reviews the pertinent legal decisions on the issue of insurance. In
addition, this article examines the opinion and concerns of the American
Medical Association regarding licensure of provider organizations and
networks.
THE DEFINITION OF INSURANCE BASED ON
CASE LAW AND STATE STATUTE
Although there are many sources for the definition of the "business of
insurance," none provide a definitive explanation of what the term actually
means. When Congress passed the Federal McCarran-Ferguson Act (Act)
in 1945, it was partly to give states exclusive province in the area of
insurance regulation, and also to exempt the business of insurance from
federal antitrust laws.' The Act clearly states: "no Act shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance."2 As a result the primary
jurisdiction for insurance lies within the individual state, and every state
has enacted legislation designed to define and regulate insurance in a
slightly different manner.
In the Bulletin, the NAIC relies upon the definition of insurance
presented in Guaranteed Warranty Corp. v. State ex rel. Humphrey.' The
court in Guaranteed, in fact, was citing the Arizona insurance statute,4 that
defines insurance as "a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994). The McCarran Ferguson Act was passed in reaction to the
Coures decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) in
which the Court held that insurance transactions were subject to federal regulation under the
commerce clause, and that antitrust laws were applicable to them. In response, Congress passed
the McCarran Ferguson Act. Its purpose was stated in its first section as, "the confnued regulation
and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public intrest." See also
Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262,266 (1976) (providing a more
extensive discussion of the history of the Act and interpretation by the courts).2 Id.
I Guaranteed Warranty Co. v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 533 P.2d 87 (1975).4 ARIZ. REv. STAT. AN. § 20-103(A) (1996).
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another or pay a specified amount upon determinable contingencies."5
The Arizona definition also includes five elements generally present in an
insurance contract, including:
(1) an insurable interest;
(2) arisk of loss;
(3) an assumption of risk by the insurer;
(4) a general scheme to distribute loss among a larger group ofpersons
bearing similar risks; and
(5) payment of apremium for assumption of risk.
Although the NAIC chose to focus on Arizona law, the definition of
insurance varies from state to state. For example, in North Carolina
insurance is defined as: "an agreement by which the insurer is bound to
pay money or its equivalent, or to do some act of value to the insured
upon, and as indemnity or reimbursement for the destruction, loss or
injury, of something in which the other party has an interest.!S In Florida,
insurance applies to a contract "whereby one undertakes to indemnify
another or pay or allow a specified amount or a determinable benefit upon
determinable contingencies." I Finally, in the District of Columbia the
insurance code defines insurance companies as:
Every corporation, joint stock company, or association not exempt
herein, transacting business in the District of Columbia, which
collects premiums, dues or assessments from its members or from
holders of its certificates or policies, and which provides for the
payment of indemnity on account of sickness or accident, or a
benefit in case of death shall be known as 'health, accident, and
life insurance companies or associations.' s
While every state has a slightly different provision regarding
insurance, all definitions of insurance seem to share the common element
5Id.6N.C. GEN. STAT § 58-1-10 (1995).
7 FA. STAT. ANN. § 624.02 (1995).
D.C. CoDEANN. § 35-202 (1996).
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of spreading or shifting of risk? Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
has even recognized that if no underwriting or risk exists in a contractual
agreement, then no policy of insurance exists.10 This factor was
highlighted by the United States Supreme Court in its intercpretation of
insurance in Group Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,"' where the
Supreme Court found "the underwriting or spreading of risk as an
indispensable characteristic of insurance."' 2 Thus, to determine whether
a contract is one of insurance or of indemnity, "there must be a risk of loss
to which one party may be subjected by contingent or futur, events and
an assumption that it be a legally binding arrangement by another. Even
the most loosely stated conception of insurance ... requires these
elements.M13
The Group Health & Life Ins. Co. decision involved an antitrust
action in which the court examined whether an arrangement between a
Texas insurance company and a group of pharmacies constituted the
business of insurance under the MeCarran-Ferguson Act. 4 In this case,
the pharmacies entered into an agreement with an insurer to provide
prescriptions to policyholders for two dollars per filled prescription, the
remainder of the cost to be paid to the participating pharmacy by the
insurer. If the prescription was filled at a non-participating pharmacy, the
price would not be discounted.'5 The Court found this arrangement did
not constitute risk spreading, but merely risk reduction of the underwriting
obligations for the insurer who had negotiated a maximum price the
insurer would pay for the purchase ofprescription drugs. In addition, since
the agreement was between the insurer and a party involved in the sale of
9Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation ofProviders that Bear Risk 22 A. 3 L.
&MED. 361, 369 (1996).
'
0 S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65,73 (1959).
11Group Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), reh'g dented, 441 U.S.
917 (1979), appeal after remand, 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985).
121d., 440 U.S. at212.
13 Id. at 214.
14 Id. at 212.
Is Id at 209.
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goods and services, rather than between the insurer and insured, the Court
denied that any risk spreading had occurred.16
Another antitrust case that focused upon the spreading of risk was
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v,. Pireno7 in which the United States Supreme
Court examined an insurance company's use of a professional medical
association's peer review committee, -which was devised often licensed
chiropractors. The committee was employed to provide advice on the
necessity of treatment and the reasonableness of fees charged by other
practicing chiropractors. Upon review, the Court found the insurance
company's use of the peer review committee in such a manner did not
constitute the business of insurance as contemplated by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Since the use of the peer review group was
unrelated to the relationship between insurer and insured and the
spreading of risk involved in that contract, the Court found the
arrangement between insurer and committee "play[ed] no part in the
spreading and underwriting of a policyholders risk."" Furthermore, the
Court summarized the requirements for insurance as the following:
[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within
the insurance industry. 9
In reaching its conclusion in Union Labor Life, the court relied upon
three of the factors of insurance as set forth in Group Health & Life hs.
Co.2 These factors were 'whether the activity:
(1) involved the underwriting and spreading of risk;
(2) involved an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship; and
"sGroup Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), re'g dnfed, 441 U.S.
917 (1979), appeal after remand, 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1160(1985).
,
7 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
18
' L at 130.
19 Id. at 129.
1 Group Health & Life Ins. Co., 440 U.S. at 205.
1997]
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(3) was limited to entities within the insurance industry.
Even after closely examining these elements, the Court concluded that the
peer review committee did not involve the spreading and underwriting of
risk since the arrangement between the insurer and the conmmittee was
"logically and temporally unconnected to the transfer of risk accomplished
by Union Labor Life's insurance policies.'*1 In addition, the Court found
the peer review group was not an integral part of the imurer-insured
relationship and the mere involvement of parties who were traditionally
outside the insurer-insured relationship was not dispositive in determining
whether an arrangement involved insurance?2
Finally, the Group Health & Life Ins. Co. analysis was also applied
by the United States Supreme Court in Metropolitan Lifr Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts" in order to discern to discern whether a state mandated
mental health benefits statute regulated insurance within the meaning of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).24 The Court
found the statute regulated the business of insurance since the intent of the
legislature was to spread the risk of providing mental health care services,
and the state statute directly limited the type of insurance the insurer might
sell.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSURANCE RISK,
BUSINESS RISK AND SERVICE RISK
Courts addressing the issue of insurance have recognized that not all risks
are insurance, and the mere existence of risk does not establish an
insurance relationship. Since nearly every business venture entails some
assumption of risk, "sound jurisprudence does not suggest the extension,
by judicial construction, of the insurance laws to govern every contract
involving an assumption of risk or indemnification of loss that when the
question arises each contract must be tested by its own terms ..... ,25 Thus,
21 UnionLabor Life Ins. Co., 458 U.S. at 130.
22Id. at 133.
23 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
74 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996).
25 Transportation Guarantee Co., Ltd., v. Jellins, 174 P.2d 625, 629 (1946).
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in examining the relationship between two entities, courts have held that
the element of assumption of risk or indemnification of loss is not
controlling, and should not outweigh all other factors. 6 As explained in
California Physician's Servs. v. Garrisol,27 the question is not the absence
or presence of assumption of risk, but whether by loodng at the plan of
operation as a whole, "it is service rather than indemnity that is the
principle purpose. ' 2
The NAIC also has recognized this distinction between insurance
risk, business risk, and service risk, 9 and has created a general outline
focused on what is not considered insurance risk, including discounted
fee-for-service, per diem, per case, diagnosis related groups
(DRG)/ambulatory patient groups (APG), and global and bundled fee
arrangements?' According to the NAIC, these payment methodologies
involve risk shifting rather than the distribution of risk, that is necessary
for an insurance contract. Conversely, the NAIC believes that an
insurance contract does involve payment methodologies including
capitation, percentage ofpremium, bonus and penalty schemes, withholds
and risk pools, and the assumption of a corridor of risk associated with
stop-loss plans?' Because none of these reimbursement methods are tied
directly to the utilization of a specific employee, the NAIC considers them
to be analogous to traditional indemnity insurance. -2
Ultimately, the NAIC definition of insurance is of limited use, since
it fails to take into account alternative definitions of insurance, including
those which focus on issues of taxes or legal precedent involving the issue
of insurance. In fact, the United States Supreme Court which has clearly
I Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239,245 (1939).27 California Physicians' Servs. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1946)
2  at 16.
21 Memorandum from the APGA, Response to the NAIC Memo on "Issues Relating to Risk-
Bearing Entities in the Health Insurance Markt," Mar. 15,1996 (quoting letter written by David
Randall from the Ohio Department of Insurance).
31 Memorandum from Stephanie Lewis of the NAIC to State & Federal Health Insurance
Legislative Policy (B) Task Force, NAIC Memorandum on Issues Relating to Risk Bearing
Entities in the Health Insurance Market, Mar. 15, 1996, at 9.31 Id at 10.
32 d
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distinguished between insurance risk and service risk,33 has never utilized
payment methodology as a criterion for classifying such contracts.
Instead, the distinction between service risk and indemnity risk is perhaps
best illustrated by imagining a contract to maintain propeity, such as a
fleet of vans or a photocopier.34 Although the value of repair is promised
upon injury of the vans or photocopier, courts and regulators have held
that the "authority to regulate does not exist where the risk is incidental to
a contract whose main purpose is the delivery of some services." 35
Directly on point is the case of Transportation Guarantee Co., Ltd.
v. Jellins,/ where the Supreme Court of California examined two
guaranteed maintenance contracts under which the plaintiff agreed to
perform periodic maintenance, to repair and replace parts, ad to garage
and fuel the defendant's vehicle for a fixed monthly sum. 37 The court in
Transportation Guarantee Co., found these obligations did not place the
plaintiff in the position of an insurer, since his duties were merely those
of any lessor of vehicles and, "unless we are prepared to hold that any
lessor of such vehicles, entering into such a contract, is in the business of
insurance then we should not hold that plaintiff is."3" In reaching this
conclusion, the court focused upon the fact that the truck maintenance
corporation agreed to provide its labor and services should damage or loss
occur, but never agreed merely to reimburse the defendant for loss relating
to the vehicle.
The recognition of service contracts in Transportation Guarantee Co.
has been widely followed. In Jim Click Ford, Inc. v. City of Tuscon, 39 the
Arizona Supreme Court examined vehicle service contracts sold to
customers purchasing a vehicle from the dealership. The service contracts
covered the repair and replacement of various parts of the automobile in
the event they were defective or malfunctioned, and the dealer maintained
11 Group Health & Life Ins. Co. v Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), reh'g denied, 441 U.S.
9.17 (1979), appeal after remand, 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985).
34 This example is borrowed from Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 370.
3S Id. (quoting Griffin Systems v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 575 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio 1991)).
36 Transportation Guarantee Co., Ltd., v. Jellins, 174 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1945).
3aId at 626.
32 Id. at 631-32.
"1 Jim Click Ford, Inc. v. City of Tuscon, 739 P.2d 1365 (Ariz. Ct App. 1987).
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an insurance policy to guarantee performance of its obligations. 40 Under
the contract, the purchaser would pay a one time fee to cover parts and
labor for replacement during the period of time until the manufacturer's
warranty expired, thus indemnifying the purchaser with regard to
malfunction of listed parts.4 The Arizona court in Transportation
Guarantee, Co., found the dealership had presented a business contract
rather than a service risk, and thus distinguished this contract from the
service contract in Transportation Guarantee had included incurring
costs under the contract and performing such services as providing gas,
oil, grease, tires, repairs, paint jobs, and garage space.42
This distinction between service risk and insurance risk has also been
maintained by other courts that have carefully examined each case to
determine whether a service risk or insurance risk was involved. For
example, a Texas court could find no service risk in an association that
obligated itself in consideration of yearly dues to pay for damage within
a stated amount to the owner's vehicle, 43 or in a contract that indemnified
the owner of automobile tires against all road hazards caused by defects
or collisions.' In addition, New York courts have held that where a
contractor for stipulated consideration agrees to replace plate glass
windows regardless of the cause of breakage, he was providing
insurance, 45 as was a watchmaker who agreed to replace a watch if lost
within one year from the date of purchase.G
Numerous other courts have also acknowledged this distinction
between service and business contracts. In Griffin Systems, Inc. v. Ohio
Department ofInsurance,47 for example, aNew York court found that a
motor service repair agreement that promised to compensate the promisee
for repairs necessitated exclusively from defects in the motor vehicle
_parts, did not constitute insurance.43 In another case focused on by the
4 1Id. at 1365.
41 1d. at 1366.
42/Id at 1367-68.
41 National Auto Serv. Corp. v. State, 55 S.W.2d 209 (Te.- Civ. App. 1932).
"State v. Western Auto Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256,259 (Ohio 1938).
5People v. Roschli, 9 NE2d 763 (N.Y. 1937); People v. Standard Plate & Glass Salvage Co.,
174 A.2d 501 (N.Y. 1916).
4 OllendorffWatch Co. v. Pink, 17 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 1938).
47 Griffin Systems Inc. v. Ohio Dep't Ins., 575 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio 1991).
49 il
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NAIC, Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Department of Insurance,49 the
Court of Appeals of Florida examined a plan under which participating
optometrists agreed, for a fixed annual fee, to fumih as many
replacement contact lenses as a patient desired due to loss, damage,
prescription change or cosmetic reasons.51 The court concluded that the
annual fee acted merely as consideration for an option to purchase lenses
at a fixed price, and that Professional Lens Plans, Inc. was not in the
business of insurance, but merely involved in a "service contract" or
provider agreement to provide the services of optometrists. Such provider
agreements do not constitute the business of insurance.5
Similarly in California Physicians' Servs. v. Garrison,5I a non-profit
physician-owned corporation organized by the medical profession to meet
the medical and surgical needs of persons in the lower income groups,
sued for declaratory judgment that it was not engaged in the business of
insurance under California law. California Physicians' Services (CPS)
argued that the Insurance Commissioner was mistaken when he found
them to be engaged in the business of insurance, and instead, contended
it was rendering personal services to its patients. The California Supreme
Court sided with CPS concluding that in order for a contract to be one of
indemnity, there must be a risk of loss and an assumption of'that risk by
a contract. Thus, the court felt that upon looking at the operations as a
whole, CPS had assumed no risk and had provided service, rather than
indemnity as its principal object and purpose. Therefore, the corporation
was not in the business of insurance.5 3
A distinction between the functions of service and insurance can also
be found in McCarty v. King County Medical Serv. Corporation,'4 where
a medical corporation was held to be involved in the business of insurance
even though it called itself a "service" corporation. According to the
court, the corporation was actually involved in the business of insurance
because
49 Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Dep't of Ins., 387 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
sold at 550.
51 Id. at 551.
'
2 California Physicians' Servs. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1946).
53 Td. at 12.
4 McCarty v. King County Medical Serv. Corp., 175 P.2d 653 (Wash. 1946).
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it [sold] medical protection to working people against the hazard
of injury or illness. It release[d] the employer from the care and
expense of medical and health aid to his employees. It collect[ed]
a fixed premium from each employee and reduce[d] the respective
rights and obligations of all the interested parties to a written
contract [policy]. Through its medical director it determine[d]
when coverage applies to the employee - when it d[id]s not apply.
All of this br[ought] the business of the service corporation within
the spirit and purpose of the statute s
Finally, the issue is almost put to rest in the notable case of Jordan
v. Group Health Association,6 which held that provider groups who
accept capitation payment are merely selling their services for a fee and
do not constitute the business of insurance. In Jordan, the court was
asked to hear an appeal of a declaratory decree finding the defendant
Group Health, not to be engaged in the business of insurance. Group
Health was a nonprofit corporation that provided physician services,
medical attention, and various kinds of medical, surgical and hospital
treatment to its members and dependents, similar to a modem HMO.
The Jordan court found that a contract should not be classified as
insurance if the primary purpose of its formation was the rendition of
services,57 and admitted that the identical plan and services rendered by
Group Health would be considered neither "insurance" nor "indemnity"
if offered by an organization owned, operated, and controlled by
physicians. Instead, it would be a contract for service on contingency,
though the same elements of risk and avoidance of possible consequences
would be present5 5 The court's decision focused not on whether risk was
involved or assumed, "but on whether that or something else to which it
is related in the particular plan is its principal object and purpose." 59
Consequently, the court concluded that Group Health could not be subject
53Id. at 666.
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to insurance regulation since it was created primarily to distribute health
care services to patients, rather than to assume any insurance risk.60
The Jordan court's distinction between insurance and service
contracts was later independently recognized by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in State v. Community Health Serv. Inc,. in which a
corporation unlicensed to transact insurance contracted with licensed
physicians who agreed to render professional services for a stipulated
compensation to members of the general public who contracted with the
defendant for the services of a physician.6 The court reviewed several
similar decisions62 and found the defendant's obligation to pay for services
was not contingent upon any risk, and that the business of the defendant
could not be construed as insurance.63
Another decision that followed the Jordan decision ,vas that of
Michigan Podiatric Medical Association v. National Foot Care Program,
Inc.,4 involving a challenge by eleven individual podiatrists who, as part
of Michigan Podiatric Association, participated in Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Michigan's health care program. Chrysler Corporation provided
podiatric services to its employees through the Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Program until July 1986, when Chrysler began to cover full podiatric
services for only those employees who used the services of National Foot
Care Program.65 The podiatrists displaced by Chrysler's decision filed a
complaint alleging loss of patients, income and damages to reputation, as
well as accusing the defendant of operating as insurers in violation of
state statute. The court held that although the health care contracts called
for the defendant to partially reimburse a subscriber for treatment received
from a non-designated podiatrist, this did not make the defendant an
insurer.66 In addition, based on Jordan, the Michigan appeals court
determined "the primary service offered by defendant is the provision of
0 Id.
61 State v. Community Health Serv. Inc., 30 A.2d 44 (N.L 1943).62See e.g., Stem v. Rosenthal, 128 N.Y.S. 711 (1911).
' Community Health Serv. Inc., 30 A.2d at 44.
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podiatric services to subscribers in consideration of prepayment for such
services. Defendant is not an insurer as defined in the Insurance Code."57
The logic of Jordm is also clearly adhered to inNeiv Mexico Life his.
Guaranty Ass'n v. Moore, a case involving a non-profit health care plan
organized and operated under the Nonprofit Health Care Plan Act 3 The
Act provided for reasonable regulation of membership of corporations
organized for the purpose of making health care expense payments on a
service benefit basis, or on an indemnity basis for persons who become
subscribers under contracts with such corporations.P9 The plaintiffs
brought suit alleging that the defendants were subject to the Guaranty
Act.70 The Moore court concluded that the defendants did not write any
kind of "insurance" to which the Guaranty Act applied, and that the
defendants were not "member insurers" within the meaning ofthe Act, nor
liable for any assessments levied by the Association.' The New Mexico
Supreme Court looked to Jordan in reaching its decision holding that like
the defendants in Moore, Group Health was a non-profit corporation
organized to provide paying members with various medical services and
supplies. The New Mexico Supreme Court also borrowed logic from
California Physicians' Services -i. Garrisonm and agreed that assumption
of risk was not the sole factor to be regarded, but whether services or
indemnity was the principal objective and purpose. As a result, the New
Mexico Supreme Court concluded the defendants were not engaged in
insurance based onthe fact that "defendant health plans are service benefit
organizations, as distinguished from the indemnity benefit nature of
commercial insurers."1'
Finally, another notable case that recognized the distinction between
service corporations and the business of insurance as put forth by Jordan,
" New Mexico Life Ins. Guaranty Assoc. v. Moore, 596 P.2d 260 (N.M. 1979).
6'1d. at 261-62.
70 Id. at 260.71 d See also Guaranty Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-22-1 to 17 (Michle 1978) (explaining that
"association" refers to the mechanism created by the Guaranty Act to facilitate coverage, payment
of claims, etc.)
72 CaliforniaPhysicians' Servs. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4, 16 (Cal. 1946).
New Mexico Life Ins. Guaranty Ass'n v. Mo ore, 596 P.2d 260,264 (MA. 1979).
19971 279
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
was Oracare D.P.O. Inc., v. Merin' in which the state insurance
commissioner challenged a dental plan organization that had. contracted
under an employee-benefit plan to provide dental services. In Oracare the
Third Circuit pointed out that the basic distinction between service
corporations and ordinary health and accident insurers is that while the
former undertakes to provide prepaid medical services through
participating providers, the latter only indemnifies an insured :for medical
expenses up to a certain schedule of rates stated in the policy.75 The
primary purpose of the medical service corporation is to provide
physicians who will render services to subscribers. Thus, Oracare neither
acted as an insurer nor competed directly with insurance companies,
providing "a reasonable basis exists for [its] separate classifica ion and the
different legislative treatment given [it]."' 76
Although these decisions vary in their logic and outcome, overall it
could be said that one of the key factors used to identify whether an entity
is involved in insurance risk or service risk, is to determine what party
makes the capitation payment to the contract. If the contract calls for
payment to a provider who directly contracts with an employer or other
direct consumer, the insurance regulators will likely find that the contract
constitutes insurance. On the other hand, if the capitation payment is
made to a provider from an insurance company, IMO or other regulated
entity, it will likely be considered a service contract.77
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS: WHEN DO THEY
CONSTITUTE THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE?
Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) are systems composed of
physicians and secondary health care service providers organized to
7I Oracare D.P.O., Inc. v. Merin, 972 F. 2d 519 (3d Cir. 1992) (cited for court's reasoning,
although vacated by settlement).
75 Id. at 2726.
761 Id. (referring to the New Jersey State Supreme Court decision in New Jersey Assoc. of Ins.
Agents v. Hosp. Serv. Plan, 128 N. J. Super 472 (App. Div. 1974), rev'don otherg.-ounds, 68 N.J.
213,220(1975)).
'1 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 371.
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manage costs directly affecting the delivery of health care services. 8
MCOs generally assume the costs associated with providing health care
services for a fee charged to the individual subscriber. The risk of loss in
excess of the premiums is then typically shifted by reinsurance
arrangements79 through a capitated payment system that establishes a fee
per member that does not vary, regardless of how much each member
requires. In exchange, the MCO agrees to provide the care needed by that
member during the payment period; at the same time, the MCO is
motivated to economize in order to provide the required care at a profit"s
Although only 6 percent of the population is currently fully capitated, it
is estimated that more than 50 percent of the nation's population will be
capitated bythe year 2005.1
HMOs
Health Maintenance Organizations (MOs), are a type of managed care
organization regulated separately from ordinary health insurers. Typical
state statutes define HMOs as "any person who undertakes to provide or
arrange for the delivery of basic health care services to enrollees on a
prepaid basis except for copayments and deductible: 'a The Federal HIMO
Act, which was passed in 1972 by the Nixon Administration, was created
particularly to promote the development of capitated health care delivery
for the non-elderly population.' The Act was largely a response to health
care cost inflation precipitated by the enactment of the Medicare Act five
years earlier, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Medicare was
designed to look and function like a private health insurance program, so
as to gain the cooperation of providers and to minimize disruption in the
78 John L Washlicl, Nonprofit Healtheare Organizations: FederalIncome Tax Issue, Managed
Care Organizations, BNATAXMANAGMENTPORTFOL1O, 873 T.M. 1, A55-A65 (1995).
so Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 363.
31 Julie Johnsson & Mike Mitka, Showdown at Capitation Corral, A. MED. NEW, Aug. 15,
1994, at 1.
I Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 372 (quoting Daniel W. Krane, Uniform Approach To PJsk-
Assuming Entities CouldAvoLdInsolvencles, Federal Rogilatons, 4 BNA I-ALTH REP. 42, 1636
(Oct 26, 1995).
s' Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1994)).
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private market for health care services. However, increased demand and
utilization of services quickly precipitated health care cost inflation,84 and
HMOs were thought to be a way to control health costs through non-
regulatory means.85
In 1973, Congress inaugurated a federal program to promote the
development of HMOs in the private market, 6 and began requiring
employers with over twenty-five employees who sought to receive
favorable income tax" treatment, to offer an HMO option where
federally-qualified HMOs were available.87 Both Congress and Medicare
managers were nervous-about taking this step, even though research had
demonstrated that HMOs were a more efficient and cost-effective vehicle
for providing medical care.88 Mostly, Congress and Medicare managers
feared that incentives for HMOs administrators to curtail services, would
result in under service to Medicare beneficiaries, and enrollment of only
healthy beneficiaries.8 9
Ultimately, the development of the HMOs came only after much
litigation challenging the new "health care organizations" as well as
attempts to restrain these organizations from carrying on business as an
"insurer" without a certificate of authority. A perfect example of this
problem was presented in Roddis v. California MutualAssociation, which
involved a nonprofit unincorporated association created to make payments
in limited amounts for medical and hospital services rendered to its
members using funds derived from periodic dues. 0 In Roddis, the
4 Randall R. Bovbjerg, US. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical Development and
ChoicesFor The 1990s, 21J.L.MED&E'ics 141, 151 (1993) (citing U.S. Dep't of Commerce
data and explaining that by 1990 medical prices rose to 800 percent of their 1960 level, and
national health expenditures moved from less than 5 percent of the GNP in 1960 to 13.9 percent
in 1990).
'Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in OpitatedHealth Plans, 22 AM. J.L.
and Med. 301, 305 (1996).
SFederal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, supra note 83.
2 7Kinney, supra note 85, at 305.
" Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Managed Care: Symposium of Consumer Protectlon in
Managed Care, Mechanisms of Consumer Protection - The Marketplace and Regulation:
Medicare Managed Care From the Beneficiary's Perspective, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1163, 1173
(1996).89 Id. at 1174.
I Roddis v. California Mutual Ass'n, 441 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1968).
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Supreme Court of California looked to Jordan in determining the nature
of the health plan, and was cognizant of two policy considerations:
indemnity features that force the member to bear risk of personal liability
for medical services, and a strong social policy to encourage the services
that health plans provide the public. While the court did find the
defendant to be in the business of insurance, they noted that "care must be
taken to always make it possible for new plans to enter the stage, for
health is a commodity which has too few purveyors.-"
Today, most states have developed a regulatory approach toward
HMOs that recognize their unique attributes, since HMOs do not fit into
the "insurance mold. ' HMOs are also recognized under the Federal
Health Maintenance Act of 1973 (Act),93 which defines an HMO and the
manner in which it must be organized in order to be qualified under the
Act. These requirements include that the HMO:
(1) assumes a contractual responsibility to provide or insure the delivery
of a stated range of health services, including at least physician and
hospital services;
(2) services a voluntary enrolled, defined population, broadly
representative of the various age, social and income groups in the
area which it serves;
(3) requires a fixed periodic payment to the organization that is
independent of its use of services;
(4) may not expel or refuse to enroll any member because of his or her
health status or his or her requirements of health services;
(5) assumes at leastpart of the financial risk and or gain on aprospective
basis for the provision of basic health care services and makes
adequate provisions against the risk of insolvency; and
(6) has established internal procedures for hearing and resolving
grievances, and ongoing quality controls for monitoring quality
assurance and utilization. 94
91 L. at 588 (quoting 15 ASSEmLYInmRiMREPORT26, Finance and Insumace (1961-1963),
at36).
'2 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 375.
93 Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, supra note S3.
I Washlick, supra note 78, atA-55. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300(c) (1994).
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When HMOs were first developed in the 1970s, there was no clear
law under which they were to be regulated. Although required to meet
certain standards under the Federal HMO Act,95 in terms of receiving
federal financial support, regulation of liMOs was left largely to the states
by insurance regulators. Since HMOs were not purely insurance, but
incorporated a service function as well, the states determined that they
needed to look to the individual HMOs' financial solvency, along with th&
quality of service delivery. Today, HMOs are strictly regulated in every
state, usually by both the state insurance department and the state
department of health,96 who usually regulate financial solvency
requirements, quality assurance, utilization management, delivery
networks, and such financial details as the type of investments HMOs can
make. 97
An HMO typically contracts with physicians and health care
providers for the provision of basic health care services in exchange for
a fixed fee. These fees may be established by paying a fixed salary,
combination of salary and bonuses, a fixed fee per niember, or a fee-for
service (FFS) if the provider is a hospital, specialist, or an out-of-area
emergency care provider." In return for the IMO agreeing to provide
these medical services, members contractually agree to make certain
periodic payments.Y
Although there is no universal HMO model, the, IRS has
characterized IMOs into four basic models based on the :relationship
between the HMO and the physicians contracting to provide the actual
medical services to the IMO's members. These models include:100
StaffModel lIMOs- In these type of liMOs, health care services are
provided by physicians and other health care professionals, who are
95 Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, supra note 83.
1 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 375 (quoting Physician Hospital Organization: State
Regulators Play Catch-up, at 1 (1994) (unpublished report available from Ernst & Young by
calling SondraKlimacek at 212. 773.5164)).
97
.Id (Quoting NItCHELE GARViN, HEALTH MAuTENANCE ORGANIZAnONS, 4 HEALTH CARE
CORPORATE LAW: MANAGED CArE, ch. 1, § 1.5 (Mark A. Hall & William S. l3rewbakcr eds.
(1996)).
93 Washlick, supra note 78, at A-55. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300(c) (1994).
s9 9 
100GCM 39829 (8/ 30/90).
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salaried employees of the HMO. Services are provided at one or
more locations directly to members who have contracted for services.
IMO members cannot seek medical care outside the lIMO, and the
salaried physicians who are employees of the IO, cannot practice
outside the HMO. In addition, staff bonuses are offered to physicians
based on HMO performance as a means of encouraging
cost-containment and utilization.
Group Model- In a group niodel HMO, care is provided in a central
location by physicians already practicing in a group practice. The
group receives a fixed dollar amount payable per month to service all
the health care needs of a certain number of the HMO patients for a
specified time period. Thus, the number of enrollees determines the
group's income, and only by keeping its costs lower than the
capitated fees will the practice be able to realize a profit.
Independent Practice Associations (VA) Model- An IPA itself is
usually a separate, related or unrelated, physician-controlled
association which negotiates managed care contracts on behalf of its
physician members and performs administrative services required by
theHMO contract. Physicians practicing independently in their own
offices contract with the IPA which, in turn, contracts with an IMO.
The HMO compensates the IPA for services on a capitated basis, and
the IPA then compensates the physicians for their medical services
on a fee-for-service basis.
Network Model- A network model provides medical care through
two or more medical practices.
Whether HMOs should be considered insurance is debatable. By
analogy, perhaps the HMO could be considered to be within the business
of insurance since other prepaid plans, which are similar in function and
purpose, have been found to constitute insurance. 0' In addition, insurance
"I1 See e.g., Cleveland Hosp. Ass'n v. Elbright, 45 N.E. 2d 157 (1942) (discussing nonprofit
hospital selling prepaid care contracts found to be involved in the business of insurance); Bloom
v. Northern Pacific Beneficial Ass'n, 193 N.V.2d 244 (1971) (finding an unincorporated
1997] 285
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
companies also meet the requirements set forth in Group Health & Life
Insurance Company.1 2 At least for tax purposes, an association must
involve both risk shifting and risk distribution to be labeled as
insurance.'03
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defines an insurance company
as a company whose primary and predominant business, is the issuing of
insurance or annuity contracts or the reinsuring risks underwritten by
insurance companies. 114 However, not all HMOs are considered to be
insurance companies. For example, in Jordan, discussed above, the court
found an HMO type organization that furnished services in its own
facilities through contracts with physicians who received a fixed annual
compensation not to be engaged in the business of insurance. 05 In
addition, the IRS ruled in Rev. Ruling 68-27 that an organization
structured similarly to a staff model HMO, which issues medical service
contracts to groups or individuals and provides direct medical services to
its subscribers through salaried physicians and nurses, is not an insurance
company for federal income tax purposes since it lacks any shifting of
risk.0 6 The factors the IRS examines in making a conclusion about
whether a company is providing commercial-type insurance are whether:
association of railway employees who provided medical, surgical and hospital care to its members
who payed premiums under a payment plan was in the business of insurance); McCarty v. King
County Medical Serv. Corp., 175 P.2d 653, 666 (1946) (declaring company selling prepaid
medical protection against hazard of injury or illness to which each employee paid a fixed
premium based upon a written contract in the business of isurance); Maloney v. ,Anerican Indep.
Medical and Health Ass'n, 259 P.2d 503 (1953) (finding that a corporation that entered into
contracts with licensed physicians, surgeons and hospitals to make available services to its
members based upon prepayment ofa fee assumed insurance risk); Mansen v. California Dental
Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (stating that a corporation that contracted to provide
dental services or prepaid premiums and underwrote actuarial risks that payments would be
sufficient took on insurance risk).
102 Group Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), reh'g denied, 441
U.S. 917 (1979), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
103 Helvering v. Le Giese, 312 U.S. 531 (1941); Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 188
(2d Cir. 1950); Rev. Rul. 68-27, 1968-1 CMB. 315; GCM 33144 (12/2/65); Rev. Rul. 60-275,
1960-2 C.B. 43.
04 Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(n) (1996) (The primary and predominant test is satisfiel if income from
insurance contracts exceed 33 percent total income).
los Jordan v. Group Health Assn. 107 F.2d 239,245 (D.C. Ct. App. 1939).
' Rev. Rul. 68-27, 1968-I C.B. 315.
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(1) a risk is being transferred and distributed;
(2) to what extent the entity is operating in a manner similar to for-profit
insurers;
(3) to what extent the entity is marketing a product similar to for-profit
insurers;
(4) to what extent the entity provides health care services directly; and
(5) to what extent the entity has shifted a risk of loss to the service
providers through salary or fixed fee compensation agreements.0 7
The IRS has, however, found some HMOs to be insurance companies
for tax purposes, including for profit IPA-model HMOs.103 An IPA, is an
organization established and controlled by physicians who negotiate with
an lMO on behalf of its member physicians.' The courts have
distinguished the IPA from the staff-model HMO analyzed in Rev. Rul.
68-27, since the IPA-model IMO did not hire physicians or medical staff
for its subscribers, but merely contracted with physicians in private
practice to provide services on a fee-for-service basis.1 The IRS
determined that since staff-model HMOs do not typically issue annuity
contracts or reinsure risks underwritten by insurance companies, in order
to determine whether an lIWO qualifies as an insurance company for
federal income tax purposes, its primary and predominant business
activity during the taxable year must be the issuance of insurance
contracts. 1 '
PPOs
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), contract with a network of
providers who deliver services to enrollees in accordance with a
negotiated fee schedule. This usually occurs through discounts, per diem
rates or payments based on DRGs (Diagnosis Related Groups). The PPO
sells to insurers and self-funded employer plans; and, while enrollees pay
'o'Id; See also GCM 39703 (Feb. 26, 1988).
'DeTech. Adv. Mer. 94-12-002.
109 Id
"I Washlick, supra note 78, at A-65 (discussing Rev. RuL 68-27).
'IId.
1997] 287
DEPAuL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
according to the fee schedule for physician services, if enrollees go to a
provider who is not part of the PPO, the costs of care is higher."2 PPOs
usually do not take on insurance risk for arranging the network."3
PSOs
Reform of health care is flourishing in the private marketplace, a sector
that has long understood the benefits of managed care contracting.
Consequently, a variety of new managed care approaches have been
introduced to address both quality and cost-control of health care. One of
the newest additions to the market is the Provider Sponsored Organization
(PS 0), a health care delivery network owned and operated by providers." 4
The mission of the PSO is to contract with licensed plans, self-insured
employers, and other group purchasers to deliver health care services.
PSOs themselves can be clinics, medical groups, hospitals, skilled nursing
facilities, home health agencies and other licensed health care providers
that contract with third party payors, including self-funded ERISA plans.
PSOs are a restructured delivery system in which provider networks
contract directly with employers in order to more directly address patients'
needs. They are distinguishable from other kinds of health plans,
because PSOs are health care providers as opposed to financial
intermediaries. Whereas HMOs and insurance companies typically
concentrate operating assets in their administrative capacity to collect
premiums and buy medical services for their plan members, providers who
own and operate PSOs have their investments concentrated in health care
delivery.1 5
12 PAiCiA YOUNGER, LEGAL ANSWERBOOKFORMANAGED CAPE, at 10 (Aspen Publishers
1995).
113 A survey conducted by the American Managed Care Review Association in October 1994
found only 4 percent of PPOs were at risk, while 16 percent of hospitals and 7 percent of
physicians were at financial risk. AMCRA, 1994 - 95 Managed Health Care Overview, at 20
(1995).
114 The term PSO refers to a full spectrum of health plans and networks, including IPAs, PHOs,
MSOs, and PPOs.
"1. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Provider Sponsored Organizations and Provider Service
Networks-Rationale and Regulation., 22 AM. . L. & M ED. 263, 267 (1996). (One way for
providers to create PSOs is to create a new corporation owned by the providers).
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Creating PSOs also increases opportunity for providers to regain
control over decision making and to enter more favorable economic
arrangements, especially for those physicians who want to keep their
practices and are wary of more tightly integrated organizations.
Employers also benefit when they contract with PSOs by being able to
eliminate an unnecessary layer of administrative costs, since they
currently pay for two management structures to manage risk - the one
developed by the IMO to manage the risk it takes on from the employer,
and the one created by the provider network to assume risk from the HMO
(downstream contracting). These administrative costs represent 23
percent of U.S. health care spending.116 By contracting directly, the
employer can eliminate the management costs and profit of the HMO
since PSOs are not intermediaries or network arrangers.
Finally, because the employer works directly with the provider, direct
contracting can yield better service and quality for the self-funded
employer. This is also appealing to employees who would prefer to have
their physicians decide where to draw the line on individual treatment,
rather than allow limits to be set by their insurer or HMO.
A survey ofprovider organizations taken by Ernst & Young L.L.P.
in 1994, found that most were created for the following purposes:
(a) contracting with managed care organizations;
(b) collaborating with medical staff,
(c) improving relationships with community physicians;
(d) sharing financial risk among provider participants; and
(e) enhancing quality of care.117
Many PSOs and provider service networks (PSNs) have been successfl
in reducing the rate of increased health care costs"' because they control
expenses more effectively, while maintaining or enhancing the quality of
" Louise Kertesz & Joanne Wojcik, Risky PHOs Winning Bet: Some Integrated Delivry
SstemsAre Pulling The Strings Under Capitation, But many Will Find It Too Big OfA Gamble,
MODERNHEALTHCARE 46 (1996).
7 Ernst & Young, LLP, Pysician-Hospital Organizations: Profile 1995, at 8 (Feb. 1995) (For
information on getting copies ofthis report you can contact a local Ernst & Young professional).
"I GAin m & EDWARD B. HsHFD, hm ED CARE Am Tm i , A S Lf.4Y oF
NAIONALTRENS AF CMTNGPHYSCrANS, at 12-13 (2d ed. 1995).
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care. This is largely the case because "changes occurring [in the medical
field] are those in the application of medical science and can best be
managed by organizations led and operated by providers."1 9
Delivery systems that have significant physician system integration,
have also been found to perform better than those that do not. 20 This is
largely because it is not possible to "achieve any measurable level of
clinical integration for patients without a close relationship of physicians
with an organized delivery system.'' A study published in the New
England Journal of Medicine, conducted by James C. Robinson and
Lawrence P. Casalino, reported on the cost performance of s:ix California
physician owned medical groups paid primarily by capitation- 2 The
study found that hospitals used by these six physician groups showed use
from 120 to 149 days per 1000 non-Medicare members and from 643 days
per Medicare members in 1994. Conversely, in 1993, the mean number
of hospital days per 1000 non-Medicare members for Commercial HMOs
in California was 232 days and 1337 for Medicare members.12
Do PSOs Take On Insurance Risk Or Service Risk?
Undeniably, in many respects the risk-bearing PSO is very similar to the
staff model HMO concept. For example, both forms are established as
provider networks, both provide service delivery, and both operate on
prepaid revenues. However, while PSOs assume the risk that a population
of patients will need health care services, their main function is the selling
of health care services and the risk assumption is merely incidental to the
primary objective.124 This function of PSOs resembles a service contract
or provider agreement, under which the PSO physicians provide medical
services to the employer's workers for a fixed amount.2' The self-funded
"
9 Hirshfeld, supra note 115, at 274.
110 Stephen M. Shortell, New World ofManaged Care: Creating OrganizedDelivery System, 13
HEALTH ArF'L 52-53 (1994).
121 Id. at 53.
122 James C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, The Growth ofMedical Groups Paid Through
Capitation In California, 333 NEw. ENGJ. M ed 1684 (1995).
123 Id
124 Not all PS0 are alike, and there are some forms ofPSOs which resemble insurance more than
others.
12s Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Department of Ins., 387 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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employer, however, remains responsible for delivering health care
benefits to its employees, so if the provider fails the employer must
purchase health care elsewhere. Courts have found similar arrangements
not to constitute insurance.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly
addressed the issue of whether PSOs constitute insurance, an analogy
could be made to a PSO based on the Supreme Court decision in Grozp
Health Health & Ins. Co. where the Court found that acceptance by
pharmacies of two dollars from subscribers with the difference to be
covered by the insurer did not constitute the business of insurance.
Instead, the Court found it merely "minimized the costs Blue Shield
insures in fiflfilling its underwriting obligations.""' This arrangement was
labeled by the Court as an agreement for the "purchase of goods and
services," a description also applicable to PSOs that contract with
self-funded employer plans to provide services at a price that may
miniize the employer's risk. Employers do not shift their responsibility
to pay for the health services promised to their employees in their
employee benefit plan; rather, they arrange for the purchase of goods and
services at a price that allows them to control their costs. In GrozTp Health
& Life Ins. Co., the Supreme Court found that pharmacies who believe
that they might not be able to acquire drugs for the agreed upon price and
may then have to take a loss, are not involved in the business of insurance.
It is reasonable then to conclude that for the purpose of the
McCarren-Ferguson Act, agreements between insurers and health care
providers also do not constitute the business of insurance.
There are however, different types of PSOs and some may be
involved in arrangements that do resemble insurance more than others.
The characteristics to be considered in evaluating this differentiation
include whether the PSO offers:
(a) global fees, where the PSO promises to provide all care needed
to treat a specific injury or illness for a fixed fee, regardless of
the amount of resources necessary to care for any given patient;
Group Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 20S (1979), reh 'g denied, 441
U.S. 917 (1979), appeal after remand 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cerl denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985). (This analogy is borrowed from Memorandum from the AGPA, supra note 29).
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(b) fee withhold arrangements, where part of each fee charged by
a PSO is withheld and paid only if utilization goals for the PSO
are met;
(q) capitation, where the PSO provides its services in rettun for a
fixed payment per month for each patient assigned to it;
(d) global capitation, where the PSO provides its services and the
services of providers outside the PSO for care that it cannot
deliver in return for a fixed payment per patient per month; or
(e) percentage of the premium arrangements, which resemble
global capitation except that the PSO is paid a fixed percentage
of the premium paid to the HMO.
These arrangements fall on a continuum with respect to the amount
of risk assumed by PSOs. As PSOs assume greater risk for items in the
benefits package, the risk is pooled and spread among covered lives
pursuant to capitation agreements, and risk is assumed for larger amounts
of services until the PSO cannot deliver without obtaining services from
other providers. It is at this point that PSOs resemble insurance; however,
to designate all PSOs as insurance is both arbitrary and inaccurate since
the differences among them are significant.
Although PSOs can subcontract with insurance companies or HMOs,
called downstream capitation, 1 7 many PSOs have bypassed insurance
companies and liMOs completely by contracting directly with employers
on a fully or partially capitated basis -- so called upstream capitation.128
It is this activity that has lead licensed health plans and the NAIC to
demand that PSOs accepting "upstream" risk be directly licensed as
insurance companies. A recent study of PSOs, however, indicated that
at present most PSOs enter into contractual agreements with PPOs (41
percent), liMOs (18 percent) Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans (16
percent) and commercial plans (11 percent). Only 14 percent of enrollees
served by PSOs were pursuant to a direct contract with employers. 12
9
127 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 362.
12s Id
129 Ernst & Young, LLP, supra note 117, at 8.
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Are PSOs Actually HMOs?
The PSO looks very similar to the staff-model HMO. For example, both
organizational forms are established as provider networks, both integrate
service and delivery functions, and both operate on prepaid revenue to
provide managed care.39 However, there are many significant differences
between HMOs and PSOs. For instance, lMOs are typically larger,
operate nationally with millions of subscribers, and provide access to both
hospitals and physicians (general practitioners and specialists). PSOs, on
the other hand, generally operate in a single or a few small cities, with
more than half having contracts covering fewer than 25,000 lives.,' PSOs
are especially effective in smaller towns and rural areas that cannot
support a large health care organization.' 2 And while a large health care
organization might be able to serve smaller areas on a fee-for-service basis
only, a PSO can operate profitably on a capitated basis in a smaller
market. 33 Unfortunately, because proposed PSO regulations favor highly
organized and financially powerful institutions over smaller ones newly
associated to the market, PSOs serving smaller markets will most likely
be quickly stifled.
Additionally, provider group physicians are predominantly
specialists, with three-quarters of the provider groups having physician
panels ofmore than 50 percent specialists.1 Oen provider owned, PSOs
typically contract for fewer services that the physicians themselves
provide, and simply work more hours for less pay when they fail to
accurately estimate risk.'35 This differs significantly from HMOs who
become financially liable for poor risk estimations - the very reason why
HMOs need to be regulated.
While HMOs are regulated by the IMO Act, state regulation of
PSOs has been erratic at best In the early 1990s, state regulators began
to focus their oversight on the newly integrated delivery systems with
'-
0Memorandum from Stephanie Lewis, supra note 30, at 9.
Ernst & Young, LLP, supra note 117, at 1.
'3 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 366.
"'Ernst & Young, LIP, supra note 117, at2. (The numbers used are based on the 189 provider
groups and management service organizations included in this survey).
5 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 377.
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which providers contracted. But even today, many state regulators are
uncertain about how to deal with these creatures and are awaitiag direction
from their legislatures. 3 6 Many states have treated PSOs as HMOs, others
have required them to be licensed as insurance. 3 7 Some states have not
asserted jurisdiction at all, others have only in certain circumstances.13
Currently, the majority of states have not enacted PSO-specific
regulations and there is clearly discord among the states, as well as within
the states, on the issue of how provider organizations should be regulated.
A survey by the Group Health Association of Americal39 asked state
regulators how provider groups, under four different arrangements, would
be regulated under their current state law. The four anrangements
considered, included when the provider group contracts:
(1) directly with the employer on a fee-for service basis and the
employer retains full risk for cost of employee medical services;
(2) directly with the employer on a capitated basis;
(3) directly with the employer and a budget is established to pay for
medical services. While any savings are split with the employer,
additional expenses at the end of the contract period up to 110
percent of the budget must be borne by the provider organization;
and
(4) on a capitated basis with a licensed health plan, which has contracts
with employers to provide medical coverage pursuant to a group
policy. 40
The survey results revealed that under the fee-for-service option,
regulators in forty states did not feel they had jurisdiction to require
licensure of the PSO. Under the capitated basis option, however, more
than 80 percent of regulators thought that PSOs would be required to be
licensed. The manner in which they should be licensed was uncertain,
136 Laura Kaufman & Susan Webster, GHAA Survey Finds States are Eratic in Oversight and
Regulation ofPHOs, 4 BNAHEALTHL. Pa. 28, 1063 (July 13, 1995).137 Id.
' Group Health Ass'n of Am., Survey: PHOs and the Assumption ofInswance Risk A 50-State




although some states suggested that HMO or insurance regulations would
be adequate. Still other states were unsure, unclear, or disputed the issue
among administering agencies within the state. In the third option, where
risk is transferred on a annual predetermined budget, exactly one-half of
the states responded they would require licensure, while the remaining
half remained unclear. Finally, in the fourth option, an example of
downstream transfer of insurance risk, two states reported they already
regulate such activities,' twenty-two states were still unclear, and
twenty-seven regulators stated they would require no oversight.
As indicated by this survey, because most states lack specific
regulations that address PSOs, provider groups have been regulated across
the country under a variety of different schemes. An NAIC draft
compilation of State Activity Related to the Regulation of Risk Bearing
Entities'42 reveals, for example, that Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, District
of Columbia, Kansas, Indiana, South Dakota, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and West
Virginia, have no proposed regulations to treat PSOs any differently than
non-provider based entities.143  Arkansas, Michigan, Missouri,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Delaware, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming appear to have regulated
or plan to regulate some or all of their provider-base organizations as
HMOs or other managed care service contractors. 1' In California, New
Hampshire and Maryland, the issue is being studied and regulation is
pending, while in Ohio and Oklahoma, proposed regulations specific to
PSOs are being reviewed.
As this survey demonstrates, regulation by the states has been
inconsistent and erratic. In April of 1996, New Jersey's Department of
Health released for comment final proposed regulations permitting the
assumption of risk by an authorized payer, defined by state statute as one
who actually provides health services within the scope of his/her license.
In contrast, the South Carolina Department of Insurance believes it may
141 California and Nevada.
'See NAIC Survey Respondent, DraftNo. 2, May 1996.
143 Memorandum from Stephanie Lewis, supra note 30 at 9.
144 I
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not even have the authority to license PSOs that contract only with
self-insured, single employer health plans.'45
Regulators in at least two states, Illinois and North Carolina, have
expressed the belief that the risk of using PSOs remains on the employer.
In a recent advisory opinion, the Attorney General of North Carolina
opined that a health care provider organization that contracts directly with
a self-insured employer to provide specified health care services, is not
subject to state regulation as an HMO.146
In its opinion, the attorney general of North Carolina was issuing
advice to a hospital considering a theoretical provider organization
arrangement involving a direct contract between a provider group and an
employer that sponsored a self-funded health insurance plan'47 for a
specified set of services to a set of employees and dependents. The
attorney general stated that while payment could include risk for services
provided within the provider's scope of practice, it could not include
financial risk for services outside the scope of practice, due to medical
emergencies, out-of-network services or referrals beyond the extent that
the provider can manage the care, or tertiary or catastrophic care, unless
directly provided within the network. If the providers cannot provide the
required care, it remains the employer's responsibility to protect against
catastrophic claims by taking other measures, including obtaining
stop-loss coverage. Thus any risk borne by the network is not an insurance
risk, but rather a risk of utilization over that is relatively mibnal.1 41
In analyzing whether ERISA preempted state regulation of provider
groups as HMOs, the attorney general of North Carolina found that
licensure provisions of the HMO Act are subject to preemption when they
"relate" to ERISA plans by restricting their choice of providers to licensed
entities. The attorney general found this restriction to be comparable to
state mandated benefit laws and "any willing provider laws," which
several courts have ruled as preempted by ERISA, because they directly
145 IL
14 State Agencies Disagree on Regulating Provider Networks Direct Contracting, 3NA HEALTH-
CAREDAILY, Oct 16, 1996, at 1.
14 'Provide?' was defined by the attorney general as a network or other integated system of
physicians, hospitals, clinics and other health care providers or facilities, or any combination
thereof, duly licensed as providers.
4 BNA HEALTHCARE DAILY, supra note 146, at 2.
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impact plan structure and administration of benefits.' Finally, the
attorney general determined the state HMO Acfs licensure requirements
are not saved from preemption, because the purpose of the hypothetical
contract was to obtain health services, rather to protect against a financial
risk, and thus there existed no insurance contract that could be subject to
state regulation.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Illinois Department of
Insurance (Department), which issued a bulletin in April 1996 stating that
a contracting provider group is not subject to regulation by the state,
whether it assumes no risk, full risk, potential risk or dovnstream risk.
Instead, the employer or licensed entity remains at risk.' The Department
reached its conclusion upon finding there was no direct contractual
obligation made by PSOs to employees covered under self-insured
agreements. Since, the contractual agreement is "only between the
provider group and the self-fiinoed employer, licensed insurer or HMO,
who continues to have fill and direct responsibility to the individual ifthe
provider group fails to perform, the employer, insurer or HMO is still at
risk to either provide or pay for health services.")s' According to the
Department, only when a health care provider group becomes the ultimate
risk bearer and is directly obligated to individuals to provide, arrange for,
or pay for medical services, the provider group must be appropriately
licensed as an HMO, limited health service organization, or insurance
company.15
"'See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Stuart Circle Hospital
Corp. v. Aetna Health Management 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993), cert denicd, 510 U.S. 1003
(1993); Blue Cross &Blue Shield of Kansas City v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331 (0h Cir. 1986); CIGNA
Healthplan of Louisiana v. State, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996), rcdzg denkld, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17707 (5th Cir., June 4, 1996), cert dented, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 6613 (Nov.4, 1996); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield ofAlabamav. Neilson, 917 F. Supp. 1532, 1538 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
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Proposed Federal Regulation of PSOs and PSNs
There are currently no federal regulations that specifically apply to PSOs
or PSNs. The federal government, however, did consider legislation 53
that would facilitate the development of health plans owned and operated
by providers, including PSOs 4 and PSNs.55 Although the legislation that
included rule making for PSOs and PSNs never became law, the issue is
sure to be the subject of future proposals and debates. What is significant,
however, is that the proposed legislation recognized both the distinct
characteristics of PSOs and recommended that unique standards be
applied to these provider groups.
The proposed federal legislation would also have created a new Part
C option for Medicare patients as an alternative to Parts A and B of the
Medicare program and the existing part C.156 Presently, Part A covers
fee-for-service hospital services, while Part B covers fee-for-service
physician services. Patients pay a premium to receive services under part
B, and both sections are subject to copayments, deductibles, Wad limits on
coverage. 7 Part C of the Medicare statute allows a patient to choose a
qualified HMO or competitive medical plant" that underwrites the entire
Medicare benefits package, but also restricts the choice of available
providers to Medicare patients." 9
1See The Balanced BudgetAct of 1995, H.R. 2491, 104th Congress, 1st Sess. (1995) (passed
by Congress and vetoed by President Clinton, Dec. 7, 1995); Common Sense Balance Budget Act
of 1995, H.R. 2530, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (also known as Blue Dog Bill, introduced to
the House of Representatives on Oct. 25,1995); Budget reconciliation legislation for fiscal year
1997 (not submitted to Congress).
154 The term "provider sponsored organization" is used in all bills to refer to a health plan owned
and operated by providers that would underwrite the Medicare benefit package for Medicare
eligible patients.
' The term "provider sponsored network" is used in H.R. 2530 to refer to a health care delivery
network owned and operated by providers.
1s Hirshfeld, supra note 115, at264 (referring to Republican bill, supra note 153, § 8001; Blue
Dog bill, supra note 153, § 8002, Clinton bill, supra note 153, § 11201).
117 Id. at 264.
's 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1994).
"I Hirshfeld, supra note 115, at 265 (explaining that Part C is informally known as the
Medicare Risk Contract Program, because the HMOs and CMPs assume the risk that Medicare
patients will need Medical Services. Medicare pays a fixed premium to the selected HMO or CMP
who in turn must provide the full Medicare package to patients. "To the extent that HMOs can
provide the package (including a reasonable profit) for less than the premium, they must provide
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The proposed part C would have expanded the types of health plans
currently available to Medicare patients to include PPOs, PSOs and other
plans that could even choose to offer greater benefits to Medicare patients
for an additional premium. Although health plans that could be used under
part C would require licensing under state law, according to both the
proposed Republican and Blue Dog bills, the state licensing requirements
would be preempted if they failed to meet standards developed for Part C
by the federal government.16 The standards would include requirements
for coverage of services, quality assurance, credentialing and retention of
provider, utilization review, solvency, and more.16'
An example of the federal governmentfs recognition of the unique
characteristics of PSO's as compared to other managed care plans, is that
the proposed regulation included requirements for PSOs that differed from
other part C health plans. In fact, all three bills would have required
separate solvency standards be set for PSOs, thus recognizing that PSOs
are able to meet solvency requirements with smaller amounts of liquid
financial resources." This is largely because PSOs have the capacity to
deliver care, they are able to weather unexpected patient needs, and
require fewer assets to pay for unexpected health care demands.
Conversely, because most health insurers are financial intermediaries, they
must purchase any unexpected amounts of health care services needed by
their beneficiaries. 64
The ability of providers to deliver care without large financial
reserves is an opinion that was shared by the New Jersey Supreme Court
additional benefits to the patients." 42 U.S.C. § 1395mn(g) (West 1992)). Consequently, an
HMO or CMP may provide more benefits to patients than the FFS program under parts A and B).
. 1 0 Republican bill, supra note 153, §8001 (a)! S.S.R. §§ 1853(a)(2)-(6), 1856(c); Blue Dog
bill, supra note 153, § 8002(a)IS.S.R. §§ 1854(b), 1856(e).
"6 These sections are found throughout the bills.
162 Republican bill, supra note 153, § 8001/ S.S.R. §§ 1853(d)(2), 1856(b); Blue Dog bill,
supranote 153, § 80021S.S.R. §§ 1854(b), 1856(c); Clinton bill, supra note 153, §11202/S.S.R.
§§ 1851A(e)()(E), 11203(a)(2).
11 See Hirshfeld, supra note 115, at 268. Liquid financial resources usually include cash or
other assets easily turned into cash. Because PSOs generally concentrate in the area of health care
delivery, much of their assets are land, buildings, equipment and personnel, which are often not
recognized as assets for conventional solvency standards since they cannot be really turned into
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in New Jersey Ass 'n oflndepen. Ins. Agents -v. Hospital Serv. Plan ofNew
Jersey65 where the court examined a student accident insurance plan that
provided fifteen specified benefits,166 allegedly in violation of Federal and
State constitutions by not complying with insurance statutes. Although the
Appellate Division found the plan to be a typical insurance policy, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that while any coverage ofl'ered by the
plans must essentially be inthe form of service benefits in order to avoid
being labeled as insurance since, "where certain services and items are
incidental to service benefits, indemnification may be permissible."'167 The
New Jersey Court found the Student Accident Insurance Coverage to be
a legitimate activity, but proposed it be reviewed to ensure it was in fact
restricted essentially to service benefits. The court concluded by stating
that:
Rather than require them to maintain large financial reserves,
thereby increasing the cost of benefits provided, the Legislature
provided for the financial integrity of the Plans by requiring that
they contract with an adequate number of providers of health care.
These providers serve as a substitute for the capital and assets
required of regular insurance companies. 68
Specific Regulation of PSOs Currently Employed by States
Several states have already come up with their own licensing mechanism
for provider based plans such as PSOs, although individual states'
approaches vary from week to week. The uncertainty among the states
concerning how to classify PSOs is evidence they do not fit easily into the
16' New Jersey Ass'n of Indepen. Ins. Agents v. Hospital Serv. Plan of New Jersey, 343 A.2d
739 (NJ. 1975).
" Ia at 742. The benefits included hospital services, drugs, professional ambulance service,
private duty nursing services, prosthetic devices, physiotherapist services, orthopedic appliances,
blood processing and dental services. These services are provided on a rehbursement or
indemnity basis: services by a physician, surgical services, administration of anesthesia, x-ray and
laboratory examinations by a physician, physical therapy by a physician, and drugs, medicine or
medical supplies administered or used in a physician's office or by a physician. Payment for these
benefits is made to the studentis parent or guardian on an indemnity basis or directly to the
physician if he is a participant in Blue Cross and Blue Shield.
17Id.
161 Id. at 743.
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insurance or HMO category.'69 States such as: California, 170 Colorado,'
Iowa,172 Georgia, 73 Maryland, 7 4 Minnesota, 175 Ohio, 7 6 Kentucky,17 and
Pennsylvania 78 have all enacted regulations, or will be enacting
regulations, that apply directly to provider networks and set forth
compliance criteria and solvency requirements.
(a) In California, the state Department of Corporations recently
required a provider-group medical center to obtain a limited
IMO-type license under the Knox-Keene Act in order to
operate fully at-risk and accept global capitation. While the
PSO could bear risk from licensed IMOs, it would not be
permitted to enter into direct capitation agreements with
employers or other unlicensed payors. In addition, the PSO
license was identical to those granted HMOs except for
variation in the areas of marketing, advertising, access, and
group contracts."9
(b) In Colorado, recent health form legislation, including the state
HMO Act and a 1995 Division of Insurance Bulletin, appear to
16 Id The Iowa legislature created a statute that allows an integrated delivery system to become
a risk- bearing entity without becoming either an insurer oranHMO. IOWA CODE ANW. § 96.3
(West 1994). Solvency oversight may be conducted by the Department of Insurance to
make sure the delivery system .will deliver the promised services. The entities must
provide information forastate-sponsored annualreport and meet aminimum balance of
$1,000,000, or three times the average monthly claims for third party providers.
170 Kathleen M. Illes, James M. Jacobson, The Risk in Bearing Ris Insurance and Tax
Regulators Confront Health Care Providers' New Airrangements, TEE %1SURMiCE TAX Rviw,
Nov. 1996, at 914 -915
M CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-102 (HMO Act); Division of Insurance, Bulletin 8-95
(issued Nov. 13, 1995).
172 IOWA CODEANN. § 96.3 (West 1994).
173 GA. CODE AmN. § 33-20-1 (1996).
,
74 See Md. Health General § 19-7.13.2 (applicable to Administrative Service providers); Md. Op.
Att'y Gen 90-020 (1990).
175 Minnesota Integrated Services Network Act of 1994. The hnesota statutes create two tpes
of licensed entities: the integrated service network and the community integrated service network.
The Minnesota regulatory requirements include net worth, insolvency protection and provider
risk-sharing.
17 6 The law will be codified as OHro CODE § 1760.01 (Anderson 1997).
177 KRS § 304.17A-300 (Michie 1996).
179 26 Pa. Bull. 1629.
179 See supra note 169.
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require any organization accepting risk to meet minimum
solvency standards and obtain a license as an HMO, nonprofit
hospital, or traditional insurer.18 0 The most significant
difference in the treatment ofPSOs may be found in a recently
released draft regulation governing the assumption of risk by
the Colorado Division of Insurance. The regulations affect
organizational criteria in the areas of paperwork by requiring
GAAP rather than NAIC Blank, and setting solvency standards
that employ a risk-based approach with minimum net worth as
low as $100,000.'1
(c) In Iowa, the state licenses provider groups as Organized
Delivery Systems (ODS) and requires a net worth of $1 million
or three times the average monthly claims for third party
providers." The ODS is exempted from state and :Federal
antitrust laws and is encouraged to contract with essential
community providers through hold harmless language. 83
(d) In July 1996, the Insurance Commissioner of Georgia alopted
regulations governing PSOs that added a new chapter to the
Departments rules, making Provider Sponsored Health Care
Corporations insurers who must obtain a certificate of authority
in order to operate a health plan. These corporations are subject
to designated insolvency standards and are required to include
hold-harmless provisions in all contracts. Although the
regulations require a net worth of $1 million, which is one-
quarter the amount required of liMOs, the PSO can offir only
limited services."'
(e) In Minnesota, provider organizations are licensed as
Community Integrated Service Networks (CISNs), and are
required to have a net worth of at least $1 million, reduced by
the percentage of risk ceded to accredited capitated providers.
A secured deposit of $500,000 is required and the CISN is
prohibited from entering exclusive provider contracts. In all
0 CoLo. Rv. STAT. AmN. § 10-16-102 (HMO Act); Division of Insurance, Bulletin 8-95
(issued Nov. 13, 1995).
" See Yondorf Director of Policy and Research, Regulation of PHOs: WPhv the States are
Concerned, American Association of Health Plan Conference Materials for the 7th Annual
Managed Care Law Conference, Washington, Apr. 26, 1996.
1 IOwA CoDE ANN. § 96.3 (West 1994).
183 Id.
134 GA. CoaM. R. &REGS. § 33-20-1 (1996).
[Vol. 1:267302
THE B USINESS OF INSURANCE
other details, the CISN must meet state HMO regulations
except for the reporting requirements.
() In Kentucky, a statute was enacted recently that regulates
Provider-Sponsored Integrated Health Delivery Netwvorks"5 by
requiring these entities to obtain a certificate of filing from the
Insurance Commissioner relating to the entity's capacity to
administer aspects of the health plan. The law imposes financial
requirements including an initial net worth or a surety bond of
$1,500,000 and the entities mustmaintain aminimum networth
of at least $1,000,000.1'
(g) In Pennsylvania, instead of a separate regulatory framework for
PSOs, the state enacted regulations that impose requirements on
HIOs that enter into downstream risk arrangements with
PSOs.
On April 6, 1996, pursuant to authority granted under the
HMO Act, the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance issued a
Statement of Policy on Contractual Arrangements between
HMOs and LDSs 7 and the State Department of Health issued
a Statement onApproval of.Provider ContractingArrngements
Between -MOs and PHOs, POs ad lDSs.'ts TheDepartments'
policies allow physician developed "integrated delivery
systems" (IDS) to accept financial risk from HMOs, and
included inthe definition are physician organizations, physician
hospitals organizations and super-PHOs. Risk-sharing on a
capitated basis is allowed as long as the contracts contain
hold-harmless provisions and are reviewed to ensure theliMOs
have provided for the financial viability of the IDS. All of the
entities may accept a percentage of the premium and a bonus or'
withhold arrangement for meeting utilization targets without
being licensed as an HMO or insurance company, but the
Insurance Department can challenge the contract if75 percent
or more of the premium is transferred to one or more IDS.1"1 In
all other ways, the standards used by the provider groups must
I's KRS § 304.17A-300 (Michie 1996).
"I See NAIC Survey Respondent, Draft No. 2, May 1996.
117 31 PA. CODE § 301 (1995). IDSs include PSOs, PHOs and other provider groups.
Is 28 PA CODE § 9 (1995).
Is" Maureen E. Corcoran, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Provider FinanclalRis4; Assum tion:
Regulatory Issues and Product Design, PA. DEP'r OF HEALTH{-IM INs., Apr. 6, 1996 (quoting
Statement of Policy, 26 PA. BULL. 14, 1629-1639).
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be submitted to, approved by, and considered the sune as
standards of HlIOs.
(h) In Maryland, on March 25, 1996 the state senate approved
legislation that would permit PSOs to bypass managed care
organizations and form their own 'community health
networks.' The PSO would not be treated as an insurer or
HIMO, but would enjoy relaxed consumer protection
requirements, reduced benefit mandates, and lower solvency
requirements. The bill is strongly opposed by the 1IMO
industry.'
This medley of approaches to the regulation of PSOs is an indication that
no consensus has been reached concerning their regulation. Consequently,
the regulatory gaps in state oversight of risk bearing PSOs leaves much to
be addressed. In order to assure a level regulatory playing field and
protect health care consumers, it is time that regulators idenfify PSOs as
unique integration products in the managed care industry. If insurance
regulators find it necessary to formulate regulations for PSOs, the rules
must be better focused upon the particular characteristics of PSOs so that
provider groups that negotiate an occasional managed care agreement are
not treated as insurers, and confined by an inflexible definition, when it is
clear they do not provide or function as insurance. As summed up by an
attorney for the North Carolina Insurance Department's General Counsel's
office: "there are so many variations in the managed care area that each
arrangement must be examined individually to determine if it involves the
business of insurance. '"1 91
SELF-FUNDED EMPLOYERS & ERISA
Concern regarding the regulation of PSOs as insurance companies is
focused largely on provider groups who contract directly with self-funded
employers (upstreaming). In 1992, self-funded plans were used by 65
percent of employers nationwide. 92 This amount may be expected to
191 Illes & Jacobson, supra note 169, at 917.
191 BNA IHALTH CARE DAILY, supra note 146, at 2.
192 Marybeth Burke, The Growth of Selffunded Plans Sets Hurdles For State Reform Efforts,
HOSPrrALS., June 20, 1992, at 34.
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increase especially among medium-sized employers who are having
difficulty coping with current health care market forces and rising costs193
The critical difference between self-funded plans and state regulated plans
is whether employers or insurance companies bear the risk of paying for
claims.'94 Employers retain the risk of paying for benefits in the
self-funded approach, while the insurance companies bear the risk in the
other approaches. 95 As a result, self-funded employers often purchase
stop-loss insurance, where the employer self-insures its plan expenses up
to a certain dollar amount for each claim, or up to a specific level of
aggregate expenses during the year. The employer then insures the
balance of liabilities over this amount with an independent insurer.' 5 The
debate, therefore, is whether the contract between the provider and the
employer is considered to be an agreement related to the administration
of the ERISA health benefits, and thus exempt from state insurance
regulation.' 7
Employee health care benefit plans are regulated by a federal
employee benefit regulation known as the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).98 Section 1144(a) declares that ERISA
"shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they ... relate to ... any
employee benefit plan."199 ERISA not only regulates the administration
of employee health care benefits,:  but also provides a regulatory
framework for administration of employee benefit plans among the
19' Susan Nanovic Flannery, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV., note 77, at 38 (quoting Leo Uzych,
Commentar, ERISA Erects Health Care Reform Barriers, 16 PENN. L. J. 2 (1993)).194 See NGS AIM, Inc. v. Barnes, 998 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding administrators serve
no risk bearing function); See also Roger C. Sislce & Joni L Andrio AL-ABA Course of Study:
Adanced Law ofPensions andDeferred Compensation, Sekcted Topfcs In ERIA Preemplion,
C758 ALI-ABA 45,47 (1992).
19S Longoria v. Cearly, 796 F. Supp. 997, 1003 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
S ee Eric C. Sohlgren, Note, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against ALiDS Victims:
Falling through the Gaps of Federal Law - ERISA, The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 24 LOYOLA. L. REV. 1247, 1251, n. 10 (1991).19
'Corcoran, supra note 189, at 5.
29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (1988 & Supp. 1111991).
2 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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states.20' This framework has resulted in the invalidation of much state
law and public policy by both Congress and the Supreme Court.02
To maintain uniform and consistent regulation, the preemption clause
of ERISA supersedes all state laws that may relate to employee benefit
plans,23 and the Supreme Court has given a broad interpretation to
ERISA's preemption clause allowing federal courts to invadidate much
state common law relating to health care and public policy.214
Although insurance regulation is explicitly exempted :from section
1144(a) of ERISA, limiting the statute's preemptive ability, health care
law is a nontraditional or lesser area of state interest and regulations
pertaining to provision of health care fall under ERISA, and are thus
preempted by the federal regulation.20 s Section 1144(b)(2)(a), the
insurance saving clause, provides that nothing in ERISA shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from the law of any state that
regulates insurance, banking or securities. However, the deemer clause
provision, which overrides the insurance clause and reinstates the ERISA
preemption, also clearly asserts that states cannot declare employee
benefit plans to be insurance or insurance-related and thus avoid
preemption under ERISA.206 Specifically, the clause provides that no
employee benefit plan "shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
20129 U.S.C. § 1002 (1)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2 James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption And Comprehensive Federal Heafth Care: A Call
For "Cooperative Federalism" To Preserve The State s Role In Formulating Health Care Policy,
16 CAwMBELLL. REv. 405, 410 (1994).
2o'See 29 U.S.C. § 1004. (1988 & Supp. 1111991). An exception to preemption is made for laws
addressed in §§ 1144(c)(2) and 1003(b)(3).
20 Holloway, supra note 202, at 417 (referring to Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v, Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985)). However, ERISA still prohibits states from making laws that would
directly or indirectly regulate the contents of employee benefit plans. See also Van Camp v.
AT&T, 963 F.2d 119, 122-123 (6th Cir. 1992); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's
Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991); New York State Conference ofBlue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelors, 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995); Corcoran v. United Hea.lthcare, Inc., 965
F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642 (5th
Cir. 1996).
205 Holloway, supra note 202, at 418 - 419. For a more recent decision see New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelors Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct 1671 (1995)
(upholding a statute that required hospitals to collect surcharges from insurers in order to fund a
pool for uninsured patients).
206 Id. at 419 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); See also
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts. 471 U.S. 724 (1985)).
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other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance ... for the
purposes of any law of any state purporting to regulate insurance
companies or insurance contracts. 20 7 Under this ERISA preemption,
self-insured employers have been able to design their own health benefits
rather than purchasing them, and have realized further savings from
avoiding costs of state regulation that licensed insurers pass on to their
customers. In addition, it is significant that Congress has included no
minimum level of capital reserves for employer-funded health benefits to
comply with ERISA.
Although the states have asked Congress to amend the ERISA
preemption clause for state health care law, ERISA has not been altered.
As a result, states continue to be denied the right to experiment with novel
legislation to further their own public interests.203 In Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,29 the United States Supreme Court held that
states may enact insurance regulations to implement health care policy but
that such regulations were not to regulate the content of employee benefit
plans or apply to self-funded employee benefit plans.
Recently, in New York State Conference ofBhlue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelors Ins. Co.,21 the court looked at a statute that required
hospitals to collect a surcharge from certain employers to fund a pool for
uninsured patients. Although Travelors argued that ERISA preempted any
charges imposed on patients whose insurance was purchased through an
ERISA plan, the Court rejected the argument but concluded that:
[an] indirect economic influence ... does not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself... Nor does the indirect
influence of the surcharges preclude uniform administrative
practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package....
It simply bears on the cost of the benefits and the relative costs of
11" 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(B); (1988 & Supp. 11991); See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
471 U.S. at724 (1985).2
0
3 Holloway, supra note 202, at 425 (quoting Michael S. Ackerman, ERINA: Preemption of
State Health Care Law and Worker Well-Being, 1981 U. IL. L. REV. 825 (19S1)).20 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 738 (19S5).
21 NewYork State Conference ofBlue Cross &Blue Shield Plans v. Traveors, 115 S. Ct. 1671,
1679 (1995) (rhis discussion is borrowed from an article by Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at
381).
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competing insurance to provide them. It is an influence that can
affect a plan's shopping decisions, but does not affect the f.et that
any plan will shop for the best deal it can get surcharges or no
surcharges.
Although the Court maintained it would not recognize preemption for
every indirect impact on ERISA, state laws that create acute indirect
effects and restrict employers' choices of insurers would likely be
considered preempted under ERISA.211 Because federal regulation of
self-funded employers has been so lenient, not approaching the rigor of
state insurance licensing laws, the NAIC has become concerned about
direct contracting. Under ERISA, the NAIC cannot regulate employers,
who are the ultimate risk-holders for delivering benefits to their
employees. In addition, The NAIC cannot subject self-funded plans to
minimum net worth, reserve, deposit, reporting or other solvency
requirements. In addition, it also seems that the NAIC, which, has chosen
to focus its regulation on provider groups instead, may also be foreclosed
from imposing such regulation under ERISA which, if it does preempt
state regulation of agreements between PSOs and self-insured employers,
would allow a self-funded employer to enter into a risk sharing agreement
with a PSO in order to fully cover the health care costs needs of the
employees.
One specific decisions that clearly address this issue is Oracare
D.P. 0., Inc. v. Merin12 which involved a contract that a hospital sought
to purchase from Oracare D.P.O., based on submitted bids, to provide
dental benefits to hospital employees through its employee benefit plan.
The Commissioner of Insurance asserted that Oracareds dental plan did not
satisfy the definition of an Employee Benefit Plan, because the dental plan
was not established or maintained by the employer or participants. In
addition, the Commissioner asserted the State Dental Plan Organization
Act (the Dental Act) required Oracare D.P.O. to have a Certificate of
Authority issued by the State Department of Insurance.
211 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at382 (quotingNew York State Conference of Blue Cross.&
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelors, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1683 (1995).
212 Oracare D.P.O., Inc. v. Merin, 13 EBC [Employee Benefits Cases. 2720 (D.N.J.




The Oracare court first determined that by buying group insurance,
an employer establishes a benefit plan even if the participants are not
employed by the insurance company; therefore, the contract with Oracare
established a benefit plan.213 Next, the court examined the Dental Act in
light of the ERISA preemption and concluded that the phrase "relate to"
should be "given its common sense meaning such that a state law relates
to a benefit plan in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan."214 The court in Oracare agreed with case
precedent by holding that a statute need not conflict with one of the
subjects covered by ERISA in order to relate to benefit plans,215 and cited
the Supreme Court decision in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massaclnsetts
as standing for the proposition that a law need not directly regulate
employee benefit plans to be subject to preemption.2 16 In addition, the
Oracare court emphasized the Supreme Court's holding from Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeazx, reaffirming the expansive sweep of the preemption
clause in ERISA and confirming that the phrase 'relate to' has been given
the broadest common-sense meaning such that state law 'relates to' a
benefit plan if it has a connection with, or reference to, such a plan.217
Finally, the New Jersey court concluded that the state Dental Act was
neither too remote nor too tenuous in its regulation of the Oracare plan.
In fact, the court recognized that the state was trying to directly regulate
Oracare, the effect of which would invalidate the proposed arrangement
under the hospital's employee benefit plan?" Consequently, the court
held that any regulation of Oracare by the state was preempted by ERISA.
An opinion by the North Carolina Attorney Generals' office concurs
with the Supreme Court's decision in Oracare and has held that ERISA's
state insurance regulation exception does not apply to PSOs, by
recognizing the purpose of the parties' contract in a PSO is not to shift
insurance risk, but to obtain health care services for benefit plan
213 Id. at 2724.
214 Id at 2725 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
116 Ia (referring to Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct 2380 (1985)).
217 Oracare D.P.O., Inc. v Merin, 13 EBC [Employee Benefits Cases] 2720, 2725 (D.NJ.
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enrollees.2 9 The North Carolina HMO statute specifically defines an
HMO as "any person who undertakes to provide or arrange for the
delivery of basic health care services to enrollees on a prepaid basis except
for enrollees' responsibility for copayments and deductibles." Because the
term "person" does not include professional associations or individuals,
the attorney general's letter suggests that the HMO statute allows
physician practice groups to contract directly with an ERISA employer to
provide services under a health benefit plan. The attorney general
concluded that the statutory licensure requirements for IMOs are similar
to benefit mandates that are preempted by ERISA, because they directly
affect plan structure and administration by limiting the plan's choice of
provider. However, the letter noted, state laws indirectly affecting a plan's
cost of providing benefits are not preempted 02
ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS
On August 28, 1996, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Federal Trade Commission issued a Statement of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care.221 The statement, which is referred
to as the "new guidelines," replaces older guidelines issued in September
19 9 4 .m The older guidelines restricted the size of physician networks are
limited the applicability of the guidelines to networks where the physician
assumed substantial financial risk similar to insurance risk. This
limitation made it difficult for physicians to organize networks since they
lacked both the necessary capital and management experience 1o build the
infrastructure required for capitation. In addition, alternative
arrangements, such as agreeing to offer discounted rates, were considered
to be illegal.
219 BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, supra note 146, at 2 (discussing opinion by North Carolina
Attorney General's Office).
no Id.
2' Statement Of Antitrust Enforcement Policy In Health Care, August 1996, statement 9, pp.
106-110.
222 Statement of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relation To Health Care And
Antitrust, September 27, 1994, statement 9, pp. 91-92.
1 "Financial risk" was defined as including capitation arrangements, and fee withhold
arrangements where the amount withheld was substantial enough to influence physician practice
patterns.
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The new guidelines expand the options available to physicians and
make it possible for physicians to organize legal fee-for-service networks
that can serve self-insured employers. Physicians are now permitted to
become involved in networks where there is adequate clinical and
functional integration of the physicians, and where physicians are paid on
a fee-for-service basis by payors according a fee schedule to which the
physicians have agreed. The integration may include means of monitoring
and controlling utilization of health services in order to control costs and
assure quality of care. Additionally, network physicians may be chosen
for their ability to further these goals. These functions are largely
intended to encourage a high degree of interdependence and cooperation
among physicians in order to control costs and assure quality. Under the
new guidelines, other forms of integration involving agreements on price
which are reasonably necessary to achieve integration may also be legal.
These networks can also qualify for a safety zone even if they fall
outside size limits set by the antitrust guidelines. Like the old guidelines,
the new guidelines maintain that in exclusive networks, the physicians
may deal with health plans through the network that are limited to no
more than 20 percent of the physicians in any given specialty in a market.
Nonexclusive networks, where physicians can participate in more than one
network or deal freely with health plans, are limited to involving 30
percent of physicians in any given specialty. Although the size
requirements under the new guidelines have not changed, the guidelines
clarify that networks may in fact be larger than the safety zones.
The new guidelines refer to business review letters and advisory
opinions where networks as large as 50 percent of the specialty of
practitioners involved were approved by the DOJ or the FTC. The
clarification states that merely because a physician network joint venture
does not come within a safety zone, it in no way indicates that it is
unlawful under the antitrust laws. On the contrary, these kinds of
arrangements may be procompetitive and lawfil, and such arrangements
can expect to receive favorable business review letters or advisory
opinions from the agencies.
Under the new guidelines, two scenarios are provided in order to give
guidance as to the conditions under which larger networks may be legal.
The first involves nonexclusive networks in a competitive market that are
unlikely to violate antitrust laws. In fact, the guidelines state that if in the
1997]
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relevant market there are many other networks or physicians who would
be available to form competing networks or to contract directly with
health plans, the formation of such ajoint venture would not create any
significant competitive concerns.
A second scenario that the guidelines suggest would not violate
antitrust regulation, is a network in which physicians have different
incentives. This scenario takes into account that some physicians merely
invest substantial amounts of money in the network and look to its success
as a business, as opposed to the physicians whom are contracted with to
provide medical services. The guidelines state that agencies vill consider
not only the proportion of physicians in any relevant market who are in
the network, but also the incentives faced by physicians in the networks,
and whether different groups of physicians within the network have
significantly different incentives. This would reduce the likelihood of
anticompetitive conduct.
Finally, while the old guidelines provided that physician networks
accepting insurance risk through capitation arrangements could not
negotiate with the same payors as fee-for-service arrangements, under the
new guidelines the network can negotiate both types of arrangements, as
long as management tools such as utilization review are applied to both
types of arrangements.
Application of New Guidelines to Networks
That Accept Capitation
The new guidelines also expand the number of arrangements considered
to involve "substantial risk" to include percentage oI. premium
arrangements, global fees and utilization targets that employ substantial
rewards or penalties. Percentage of premium arrangements include
networks that agree to provide designated services or classes of services
to a health plan for a predetermined percentage of premium revenue from
the plan. Global fees are more complex arrangements in which the
venture agrees to provide substantial coordination of care by physicians
in different specialties offering complementary services fbr a fixed,
predetermined payment, though costs can vary among individuals. Finally,
utilization targets involve giving substantial rewards or penalties to
physicians depending upon whether they meet utilization standards.
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Networks whose members may share these substantial risks and fall
within the size limitations described in detail above, qualify for safety
zones and will not be in violation of antitrust regulations.
To illustrate how these guidelines would apply, consider a physician
network that accepts capitation and has the physicians agree on the per
member per month amount they will accept. Panel size is restricted to 30
percent, in aggregate and by specialty, and the plan is marketed to HMOs
and self-insured employers. The physicians also contract with other
payers. This type of network would fall within the safety zone; because
the network accepts capitation, the members share substantial financial
risk, and the network falls within size limits for a nonexelusive network.
Alternatively, if the network accepted both capitation and fee-for service
arrangements with the same payor, the network would not qualify for a
safety zone. With the addition of the fee for service aspects, it must be
demonstrated that the networks involve the generation of substantial
efficiencies. This may be done by demonstrating that the cost control
mechanisms used for capitation are also applied to the fee for service
business.
Because the new guidelines are lengthy and complex, physicians
should seek legal counsel experienced in forming such networks. In
addition, under the new guidelines, opinions from the DOJ and FTC about
the legality of specific network proposals are available by sending a letter
containing information about the proposed network. Both agencies will
answer letter within ninety days of receipt of all information.
PROPOSED REGULATION OF PROVIDER
SPONSORED ORGANIZATIONS
In August 1995, The Health Plan Accountability Working Group of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issued a
bulletin to all state insurance commissioners, directors and
superintendents declaring that the acceptance of risk by provider networks
such as IPAs, PHOs, and others, constituted insurance. The NAIC stated
that any providers involved in risk sharing arrangements with employers
must have an insurance license.
However, regulation of PSOs as insurance companies may have
severe ramifications on new managed care entities struggling to enter the
1997] 313
DEPAUL JouRNAL OF HEALTH CAR LAW
market and would delay much needed market reform, a goal that seeks to
include as many competitors as possible in order to lower the price of
health care. Currently, only a small percentage of employers, about 9
percent, engage in direct contracting with provider networks, and even
fewer participate on any sort of risk-sharing basis. The negative
side-effects of insurance regulation may be considerable, including
foreclosing the entry of new organizations into the health care market and
stifling market reform, and other innovative managed care approaches to
the health care crisis.
In evaluating the NAIC proposal to regulate providers who contract
with self-insured providers, there are many factors which must be
examined, including the logic behind solely regulating providers in
upstream contracting, and whether under ERISA the NAIC has the right
to regulate self-insured employers at all. In addition, issues of solvency,
reporting, and other regulatory requirements need to be addressed in light
of the NAIC's proposal.
The Logic Behind Regulating Only Upstream Contracting
Between Providers and Employers
Although the NAIC believes that risk sharing agreements between
providers and employers constitutes insurance (upstreaming), the NAIC
has held that risk sharing agreements between providers and HMOs or
other licensed insurers do not constitute the business of insurance (down
streaming). An example of the latter may be an employer who pays an
HMO or insurer $300 a month per employee in exchange for all the health
services each employee may need. The HMO may contract for $200 a
month to a PHO, to provide most of the health care services required by
its members, who then contracts with its own primary physicians for $100
a month to provide designated services. These physicians may then
subcontract for specialty services. This trail of capitated service
arrangements leaves it unclear as to which of these provider groups should
be regulated for solvency requirements since on each level there is risk
shifting 2 4 Presently, most states, as well as the NAIC, believe that
I4 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 372.
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downstream contracting involves mere service contracts and that the
primary insurer is already regulated as an HMO. Therefore, as it currently
stands, IMOs and insurance companies can transfer downstream risk to
provider networks, but providers cannot take on the upstream risk by
themselves.
There is no outward logic in allowing an IMO to transfer substantial
amounts of risk to an unlicensed provider and simultaneously require
transfers of risk to reinsurers to involve licensed entities. Providers are
allowed to assume risk from HMOs -without a license, because the
providers can deliver the care; or in the case of global capitation, they
generally have a high degree of control over the extent to which other
providers are used. Since many employers who want to engage in direct
contracting are large, financially strong organizations that are
sophisticated and not vulnerable to exploitation, they are capable of taking
care of themselves without protection of the insurance commissioner. Just
as HIMOs and insurance companies take on the risk of the provider's
failure, so does the employer who assumes the same risk as well as the
duty to find a new source of health care for its employees should the
provider fail.
Alternatively, since not all employers are strong, abalance is required
in order to protect some employees' insurance benefits. Thus, while it is
unfair to bar capable employers from entering provider agreements,
regulation of companies that are not financially strong, or who do not have
sophisticated managerial capabilities, would not be inappropriate.
Solvency of the Provider
Capital reserve minimums required of both IMOs and insurance
companies are intended to offset possible operating losses which may
cause provider groups to go bankrupt, leaving subscribers without a source
of treatment. It is argued that PSOs who contract with self-funded
employers should be required to meet similar solvency standards.
However, such a requirement as applied to all PSOs is unnecessary since,
in fact, employers bear the risk of provider insolvency.
Whether an insurance company, HMO, or self-insured employer
contracts with a provider group, the PSO's responsibilities to provide
health care remain unchanged. The PSO is required to service the
19971 315
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[
beneficiaries' medical needs during the payment period, r-.gardless of
whether the actual hours used or the number of patients who make
appointments exceeds the providers' expectations. At no time does the
provider face financial risk when they fail to accurately predict the number
ofpatients who will seek services; however, they must continue to provide
care to how ever many patients seek their services, even if this might
result in destroying any profit they may have realized. Alternatively,
HMOs and insurance companies pay for subscribers to seek medical
services from physicians. A poor estimation of patient medical needs may
require the HMO or insurance company to suffer financial loss in order to
cover the health bills of all its subscribers. Even if a contract exists with
a provider group (down streaming), the risk of loss stays with the HMO
or insurance company.P
Similarly, a self-funded employer who contracts with a PSO takes on
the same risk as an HMO or insurance company when they promise to pay
for the medical needs of their employees. However, the PSO's
responsibilities to serve the patient population remain unchanged. In fact,
this arrangement is arguably better for the providers since they are
generally owed an average of $2,005,000 whenever an HMO goes
insolvent. 6 They can avoid this loss by forming their own contracts with
employers and making sure they meet all necessary patient needs.
Requiring a PSO to acquire a license as an insurer would be time
consuming, expensive, and would subject the employer to premium taxes.
First, solvency typically requires a license holder to have a minimum net
worth of $1.5 million. Start-up costs for more tightly integrated and
regulated health care organizations can range from $7.9 million to $30
million. 7 Furthermore, only certain kinds of assets can be counted
toward meeting these requirements -- usually liquid assets with a low
probability of significant loss in value and for which thera is a ready
Even the NAIC does not consider down-stream risk to pose a problem.
z6 Jay M. Howard, The Aftermath ofHMO Insolvency: Considerations for Providers, 4 ANN.
HEALTHL. 87, 88 (1995) (describing a survey by the Solvency Working Group of the NAIC).
7 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 366.
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market that establishes their worth, such as cash, federal government
bonds, or AAA rated corporate bonds?"
Non-liquid assets, such as real estate, equipment, and goodwill
cannot be counted toward contributions. Since PSOs generally have these
types of nonliquid assets, they must raise the money necessary to meet
solvency requirements. Because hospital and physician groups do not
have the liquid capital of large corporate insurance companies and HMOs,
and since most of their assets are tied up in physical plant and equipment
costs rather than being readily availableP PSOs most likely cannot come
close to meeting the capital associated with solvency requirements.
Currently, however, PSOs are relatively inexpensive to establish and can
be created for as little as $50,000.3
Although only a few states have independently created statutory
requirements for PSOs, the solvency requirements that have been set are
high. For example, the Minnesota Care bill signed by Governor Arne
Carlson on May 10,1994 requires community integrated service networks
that provide prepaid health services to 50,000 or fewer enrollees to
maintain a minimum net worth of at least $1,000,000.1 Likewise,
Washington's Health Services Act requires a minimum of $1.5 million in
capital. Unfortunately, thus far only Illinois and North Carolina have
recognized; that employers remain at risk when they contract with PSOs,
and that a contracting provider group is not subject to regulation by the
Department of Insurance.3 2
Licensing the PSO as an HMO would not be much easier for
providers if standards such as those set forth in the NAIC Model IMO
.
22 heNAIC Model HMO Act requires that an IMO maintain a minimum net worth equal to
the greater of$ 1,000,000 ortwo percent of annual premium revenues on the first S 150,000,000
ofpremium and one percent of annual premium on the premium in excess of S150,000,000, or an
amount equal to the sum ofthree months uncovered health care expenditures, or an amount equal
to the sum of 8 percent of annual health care expenditures, except those paid on a capitated basis
or managed hospital payment basis, plus 4 percent of annual hospital expenditures paid on a
managed hospital basis. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. Cowts'R, HEALTH MAInEANcE
ORGANIZATION MODEL AcT, NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GumELRms §
13(a)(2)(d)(I)-(ii) (1990).
22 Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 366.
Id
'-See Minnesota Integrated Services Network Ac, supra note 175.
232 Id.
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Act are required. The Act requires a minimum net worth of $1.5
million 3 and the entity must maintain a minimum net worth equal:
(1) to the greater of $1 million or 2 percent of annual premium revenues
on the first $150 million of premium and 1 percent of annual
premium on the premium in excess of $150 million;
(2) an amount equal to the sum of three months uncovered health care
expenditures; or
(3) an amount equal to the sum of 8 percent of annual health care
expenditures, 34 except those paid on a capitated basis or managed
hospital payment basis, plus 4 percent of annual hospital
expenditures paid on a managed hospital basis. 5
In addition, HMOs are required to deposit cash, securities and other
assets with a value of at least $300,000,26 at least as well as a benefit plan
in the event of insolvency z 7 and an uncovered expenditures deposit in
case uncovered expenditures exceed 10 percent of the HMO's total health
care expendituresP 8 The amount of funds required far exceeds that which
provider groups are able to raise.
A better solution perhaps might be found in a report by the American
Academy of Actuaries (AAA) developed for the NAIC that does not set
forth a comprehensive scheme of solvency standards for health
organizations, but instead creates a formula that can be used to estimate
the amount of risk-based capital that different kinds of health plans must
retain.239 Basically, the formula estimates the capital needed by a given
organization to account for four kinds of risks: asset risk,'4 insurance
2 33 d
2 Id. at § 13(A)(2)(a)-(i).
2s Id. at § 13(A)(2)(d)(1)-(ii).
,'-Id at § 13(B)(1)-(3). This amount is included in the dletermination ofthe minimum net worth
of the HMO.
237 Id. at §13(E).
3 8Id. at § 14(A).
39 Hirshfeld, supra note 115, at 291.
240 "Asset risk"' is the risk with respect to the insurer's assets.
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ris,24 interest rate risk"24 and business risk.2"3 The formula also applies a
statistical technique called the "covariance adjustment" to account for the
fact that risk inherent in each of the categories is not necessarily correlated
to the risk inherent in other categories.24
In developing the plan, the AAA gathered financial performance and
claims data from a number ofhealth plans?"4 The resulting formula is much
more flexible than solvency standards in the NAIC Model HMO Act, and
allows for a greater range of risk-based capital for HMOs and other health
plans with different characteristics. 2 The formula also recognized four
categories of managed care methods that reduce the insurance risk
including:
(1) arrangements with providers where payments are set by contractual
agreement (fixed feed per service, inpatient day, or episode of care);
(2) fee withhold or bonus arrangements with providers;
(3) capitation payments made to entities directly providing medical care
for care directly provided (does not include global capitation); and
(4) noncontingent salaries or aggregate cost payments when paid directly
to persons licensed to provide medical care.!47
This type of flexible approach is much more appropriate for PSO
regulation since it recognizes the legitimate differences between PSOs and
other health plans. Although this proposal currently results in higher
capital requirements than the HMO model, which is undesirable; these
risk-reducing factors should still be recognized in developing a proper
mode of PSO regulation.
21 "Insurance xisk' is the risk of adverse insurance espcriencc with respect to the health pl3n's
liabilities.
212 "Interest rate risk" is the risk with respect to the insures business.
24 
"Business risk'is the risk which includes all other business risks.
2  Hirshfeld, supra note 116, at 291.
2 HEALTH ORGs. RIS K BASED CAPrAL TASKFORE, A.mAi;ADif o0FA APJms, REur
To TE No L AssO crAT oF INsuRAcE Cosss St -a r s. R -isBAsE CA PiAL
WORIMGGROUP (1994) [herinafterAAA 1994 Report].
2 6Id.2471d.
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Reporting and Other Regulatory Requirements
In nearly every state, HMOs and insurance companies are subject to
complex and stringent reporting and accounting requirements, in addition
to the minimum amounts of net worth and working capital. In 1973,
Congress passed the Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act under
which HMOs can qualify for federal funds by conforming to federal
requirements. For example, some of the requirements include:
(1) maintenance of a fiscally sound operation and adequate risk against
insolvency satisfactory to the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (H-S);248
(2) assumption of full financial risk on a prospective basis for the
provision of health services;249
(3) open enrollment requirements;20 and other organizational standards;
and
(4) provisions of medical services.251
State governments, in their active support of HMOs, have also
promulgated their own regulations. For example in Florida, HMOs are
required to file an annual financial statement of the organization both on
computer diskette and on department forms.252 In addition, the HMOs
must submit an audited financial statement of the organization, its balance
sheet, statement of operations for the preceding year, certified by an
independent certified public accountant, 3 and an actuarial certification.
Also, the HMO must file quarterly reports that include unaudited financial
statements? 4 Failure to file these reports can result in fines up to $1,000
for each ofthe first ten days they neglect to file and up to $2,000 for each
day after, to a maximum of $100,000 for each report.5
18 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(1).
1142 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(2).
1142 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(4).
2142 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(1).
2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.26 (1)(a) (West 1995).
253Id. § l(e).
2A Id. § 2.25S Id. §3.
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States that have already enacted specific PSO provisions have
required hold harmless provisions, meaning that providers would have to
agree not to attempt to collect any fees or charges from HMO enrollees in
the event the 11MO becomes insolvent Hold harmless provisions are also
required under the NAIC Model HMO Act. 2 6
CONCLUSION
Regulation ofPSOs is currently a high priority concern for boththeNAIC
and state Insurance Commissioners across the country. But in regulating
these provider groups, the NAIC must be cautious to first objectively
examine PSOs and other newly integrated managed care organizations in
order to control the urge to categorize them immediately as either an
"HMO" or "traditional indemnity insurer."
Over the past few decades, Americans have become familiar with
HMOs, although when they were first introduced they too created debate
and uncertainty, much like that which PSOs have created today. Still,
without unique regulations for HMOs both by individual states and the
Federal Government, managed care could not have become the
sophisticated and comprehensive system it is today. Consequently, by
creating regulations that recognize the unique nature of PSOs, including
the variable levels ofrisk they can assume and the benefits they offer both
providers and the public, legislators will enhance this new form of
managed care as well as encourage future evolution of the health care
market.
It is difficult to overcome the powerful influence of HMOs and
traditional insurers who hotly contest the creation of PSOs. Recognizing,
however, that their bluster derives from fear that PSOs may provide a
more efficient system, makes it is easier to ignore their protests. Since the
NAIC's concern, as they profess it to be, is the well-being of American
consumers, only by completing a thorough evaluation of PSNs, while
turning a deaf ear toward the HMOs and insurers, can the NAIC
256NAIoNALASSN oF INS. COlMMf, supra note 228.
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objectively assess the value of PSOs and find a way to appropriately
regulate them without stifling their development.
322
